Significant contributions to debates in the philosophy of evidence-based medicine (EBM) have come from a variety of different philosophical quarters, yet mainstream discourse in the field has been largely devoid of contributions from scholars working in the pragmatist tradition. This is a particularly conspicuous omission, given pragmatism’s commitment to the melioristic view that philosophy both can, and should, be about the business of concretely bettering the human estate. Two exceptions to this oversight come from Brian Walsh and Maya Goldenberg. Unfortunately, (...) in both cases, the misapplication of pragmatist thinking leads to the mistaken view that EBM is committed to some form of pernicious objectivism. This article aims to revise these pragmatist critiques in order to bring them more consistently in line with pragmatist values and commitments. Doing so shows that EBM is defensible on pragmatist grounds against objectivist attacks. (shrink)

Over the course of a decade or so, Philip Kitcher has gradually come to embrace classical pragmatism, particularly John Dewey’s iteration of it, hailing it in his latest volume, Preludes to Pragmatism: Towards a Reconstruction of Philosophy, as “not only America’s most important contribution to philosophy, but also one of the most significant developments in the history of the subject, comparable in its potential for intellectual change to the celebrated turning points in the seventeenth century and in the wake of (...) Kant” (Kitcher 2012, xi). By Kitcher’s own account, this represents quite a turnabout, and so it is unsurprising that some have viewed Kitcher’s transformation warily. Philosophers are not immune to.. (shrink)